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The U.S. Pacific Command 
Humanitarian Demining Program 
Under the direction of the U.S. Pacific Command, SOCPAC guides the deploy-
ment of Special Operations Forces to mine-affected countries throughout Asia 
and the Pacific to teach clearance and develop indigenous capabilities. 
By Joe Lokey, MAIC 
T he focal point for U.S. military assistance in humanitarian demining efforts in Asia and 
the Pacific Rim is a small, two-person 
office in an obscure wing of an old 
building on Camp H.M. Smith in 
Hawaii. It is from this office that two 
members of the Special Operations 
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) plan 
and coordinate humanitarian 
demining training and equipment 
donations to Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. 
SOCPAC is a sub-unified 
command under the direction of the 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
and is responsible for activities 
covering two-thirds of the Earth's 
surface and 15 time zones. The 
training teams come from Special 
Forces units both within the Pacific benefits their combat skills and 
theater and from units based on the 
West Coast of the United States. EOD 
personnel from other military units in 
the Pacific also augment the reams. 
Once they enter a country for a 
training mission, they are under the 
operational control of SOCPAC, 
which coordinates their activities with 
rhe host nation's U.S. embassy and 
their home units. They are the ideal 
capability tO use in this important 
initiative because of the unique skills 
they develop under Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) training. 
The Role of Special Forces 
Although the humanitarian 
demining mission is a collateral 
training mission for the Special Forces 
teams, it directly and substantially 
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requirements in areas of Foreign 
Internal Defense (FlO) and 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) . These 
unique capabilities and mission casks 
led Special Forces ro be chosen to lead 
the U.S. effort ro provide this kind of 
training and assistance ro other 
nations. Not only do benefits accrue 
to those being trained, but U.S. 
soldiers also receive a substantial 
training benefit that increases their 
effectiveness. 
In this peacetime mission, as in 
its wartime task, the role of Special 
Forces focuses on using mission related 
skills (FIO/UW) tO establish and train 
a host nation organization. This occurs 
at both the headquarters and 
subordinate level, in a range of basic 
to advanced skills such as 
communications, field and trauma 
medicine, small unit leadership, and 
logis t ics support skills . Support 
training is also provided in demining 
mission planning, as well as demining 
and mine awareness teaching 
techniques. This is all done with full 
cognizance of the U.S. law that 
prohibits U.S. forces from entering an 
active mine field. 
In the execution of these 
missions, the benefits to the U.S. 
military of deploying Special Forces 
teams are clearly obvious. These 
deployments benefit the troops in that 
they provide: training opporrunities tO 
practice mission skills; experience and 
familiarity with the cultures in these 
countries; an opportunity tO improve 
already substantial language skills; and 
the ability to enhance the coordination 
and integration of the host nation and 
NGOs' involvement in their activities. 
These unique SOF skills and the 
troops' considerable coalition building 
assets make the use of conventional 
forces in chis role less effective. 
The U.S Goal 
The foundation for the U.S. 
humanitarian demining training effort 
in the Pacific, and all areas around the 
globe, is the focus on eventual self-
sufficiency and the use of the "train-
the-trainer" concept. This ensures that 
the host nation is fully capable of 
creating and sustaining their own 
demining teams and the support 
infrastructure, sooner rather chan later. 
It is through this philosophy in the 
Pacific and elsewhere that the United 
States encourages host nation 
ownership and understanding of their 
own experiences and gained 
knowledge. This is truly a way ro 
ensure that, once fully engaged, a solid 
foundation is provided for developing 
local solutions to local problems. 
By integrating NGO efforts inro 
this concept and encouraging the 
pursuit of donor support funding, a 
long-term solution tO a country's 
landmine and UXO problem can be 
easily developed and initiated. 
SOCPAC 
The SOCPAC role in humani-
tarian demining, like other U.S. 
military involvement, operates to 
enhance the regional U.S. military 
posture in the Pacific, contribute to 
peace and stability in conflict prone 
regions, have a positive impact on 
critical humanitarian situations 
around the Pacific Rim, and foster self-
sufficiency and interoperability. 
The goals of SOCPAC: 
• Relieve suffering from the adverse 
effects of landmines while 
promoting U.S. interests. 
• Alleviate the threat of landmines 
to the innocent. 
• Establish sustainable indigenous 
demining programs. 
• Encourage international coopera-
tion and participation. 
• Support the Pacific Commander-
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in-Chief's (CINC) regional 
strategy for national and regional 
security. 
• Improve the readiness and quality 
of training for the U.S. military 
involvement. 
The U.S. military is specifically 
funded for this mission through the 
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and 
Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation 
provided yearly by Congress. It 
provides the transportation, sustain-
ment and equipment needs of the 
units conducting the training, and a 
limited initial equipment provision 
that is donated tO the units being 
trained at the conclusion of training. 
These missions are coordinated with 
the U.S. Department of State, which 
provides more equipment and long-
term capabilities to aid nations 
through the Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 
Activities (NADR) appropriation. 
It is the teamwork and coordi-
nation among the agencies working to 
support a nation, in close cooperation 
with the U.S. embassy in that nation, 
that makes the U.S. humanitarian 
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demining program so effective. 
Throughout the Pacific, SOCPAC is 
recognized as the executive agent for 
humanitarian demining assistance and 
will coordinate all U.S . assistance to 
the following countries that have 
entered into a formal agreement with 
the U.S. government: 
Current Programs 
CAMBODIA 
T he U.S. assistance and training 
program began in June 1994 with an 
assessment visit that set the foundation 
for mine clearance training and mine 
awareness training. This was followed 
by the deployment of a 27 -man team 
in September of that year. There were 
three separate deployments of similar 
size and duration every year for the 
next few years until the summer of 
1997 when operations were suspended 
because of the political situation in 
Cambodia. An assessment team from 
the U.S. Department of Defense 
visited Cambodia in February 2001 to 
review the situation and determine if 
U.S. assistance could be re-engaged. 
As a result, the United States is 
planning to provide additional 
training and support to CMAC in the 
areas of medical training, munitions 
storage and handling, and vehicle 
• U.S. so ldiers 
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maintenance through 2003. This 
follow-on training has begun with the 
arrival of a medical training team. 
Approximately 50 to 90 people 
continue to be killed or injured by 
landmines each month in Cambodia. 
Current "official estimates" place the 
number of mines at approximately 4 
million-6 million spread throughout 
some 3,600 mined areas identified to 
date. These areas are estimated to cover 
about 2,900 sq. km. The Cambodian 
Mine Action Center (CMAC), an all 
civilian insitution, believes that the full 
extent of the mine problem in 
Cambodia is not accurately known. 
Mine contamination is spread 
throughout the country with heavier 
concentrations in the northwestern 
provinces. UXO contamination 
appears to be moderate to high and 
comprises mostly unsophisticated 
munitions spread throughout the 
country with possibly higher 
concentrations in the central, southern 
and eastern provinces. 
In spite of the heavy focus on 
Cambodia by the international 
community, it is likely that mine 
action operations will need to 
continue at the current level by 
CMAC for at least the next 5-1 0 years. 
Beyond that, it is likely that a reduced 
capability will be needed to deal with 
smaller or lower priority clearance 
• 4. 
tasks and numerous individual mine/ 
UXO reports- perhaps as long 50 
years. 
The military engineers of the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
(RCAF) have been involved in 
"demining" (and bomb disposal) since 
approximately 1994. Their contri-
bution to the reduction in the mine/ 
UXO threat has been quite substantial: 
according to RCAF data, their troops 
have cleared approximately 26 million 
sq. m (26 sq. km) and destroyed some 
88,000 mines, 46,000 booby traps and 
19,000 UXO. Given the magnitude 
of the mine/UXO problem in 
Cambodia and RCAF's contributions 
to date, there is a strong argument to 
continue their involvement in mine 
and UXO clearance. 
Though the use of national 
military forces for demining purposes 
is not unusual, their involvement in 
human itarian and/or external ly 
funded mine action activities is 
presently contentious or an unpopular 
option for some donors. As a 
consequence of these sensitivities, the 
Uni ted Nations developed the 
"United Nations Mine Action And 
The Use Of The Militaries" policy. 
This policy, which provides clear 
guidelines on this issue, was approved 
by the Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group on Mine Action on 25 January 
1999. For other reasons, the U.S. 
assistance through both NADR 
funding and SOCPAC will not be 
through the RCAF, nor will training 
activities engage RCAF members. 
CMAC will remain the so le 
governmental recipient of U.S. 
assistance in the foreseeable future. 
LAOS 
The UXO and mine contami-
nation in Laos led to a request for U.S. 
assistance in early 1995. An assessment 
team conducted a review of the Lao 
situation and the National Security 
Council's Interagency Working Group 
(IWG) approved U.S. assistance for a 
comprehensive Ordnance Removal 
and Community Awareness training 
program in October 1995. The 
partners in this endeavor with the U.S. 
teams were the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP). 
Training of Lao humanitarian 
deminers began in 1996 with a 
clearance and awareness mission 
coordinated by SOCPAC and the 
United States. This helped to build 
and establish the original training 
center at Nam Souang. The Lao teams 
assumed responsibility for their own 
training in October 1999 after 
certification and selection of trainers. 
Over 104,000 items of ordnance have 
been cleared since the creation of 
UXO Lao and over 700 villages visited 
with comprehensive mine risk 
education messages. 
Though U.S. military technical 
assistance ended in 1999, UXO Lao 
continues to train staff at the National 
Training Center at Ban Ylai. Over 
1,000 Lao nationals have graduated 
with a variety of mine action skills. 
UXO Lao is emerging from its 
consolidation phase and is moving 
into the sustai nment phase of its 
growth as it seeks to reduce inter-
national support and become a fully 
indigenous and sustainable operation. 
In April of 2000, SOCPAC 
conducted a technical assistance visit 
to the national Training Center and 
UXO Lao National headquarters. 
Possible U.S. assistance in the future 
will focus on training aids, explosives, 
and some smal l unit leadership 
tram mg. 
Though the mine/UXO problem 
in Laos is still large in comparison to 
other countries in the region, the 
political and security situation in the 
country is stable enough for existing 
programs to make a significant 
difference in the coming years. A small 
increase in Hmong rebel activity in the 
north does not appear to have a 
landmine aspect to it and the teams 
already trained are sufficient to engage 
any further threat. 
THAILAND 
Though Thailand itself has not 
been engaged in a major military 
conflict for quite some time, the threat 
of smaller cross-border insurgencies 
and outside conflicts have resulted in 
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a significant landmine problem for 
Thailand along its borders with four 
other neighbors. In 1998, a govern-
mental survey indicated that 
approximately 796 sq. km of land can 
not be utilized in these border areas, 
within which nearly 400,000 people 
reside. Of these mined areas, 532 sq. 
km are on the Thai-Cambodian 
border, 124 sq. km are on the Thai-
Lao border, 53 sq. km are on the Thai-
Myanmar border, and 87 sq. km are 
on the Thai-Malaysian border. 
The Lao border problem was 
primarily the result of the Thai Army 
conflict with the Thai Communist 
Party that starred in 1964 with both 
using landmines as a principle weapon 
in a jungle war. The hostilities 
concluded in 1989. The problem 
along the Malaysian border was the 
result of British/Malaysian military 
fighting with the Communist Party of 
Malaysia (CPM) from the early 1950s 
through 1989. The military junta's 
repression of minority groups in 
Myanmar (Burma) have also led to 
increased hostilities and defensive 
actions along that border. The greatest 
single use of APL and threat to 
civi lians exists along the Thai-
Cambodian border. This legacy 
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remains from the Khmer Rouge and 
other internal insurgencies. 
From 1994-99, a total of 2,837 
landmines were cleared and destroyed 
by the Burapha Field Force in Sa Keao 
province. Enhancing existing mine 
detection dog (MDD) capacity at Pak 
Chong by acquiring, training and 
deploying 12 MDDs with handlers. 
Four MDDs with handlers are 
operational with Unit #1 and 10 
additional dogs are undergoing 
training at Pak Chong Military Dog 
Center. The Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center (ADPC), an 
international training center located 
on the campus of the Asian Institute 
ofTechnology in Bangkok, is working 
in partnership with TMAC to increase 
mine awareness in Thailand. ADPC 
hosted a National Seminar on Mine 
Action in December 1999 to 
announce the launch of ADPC's 
Landmine Awareness Program 
(chaired by HRH Princess Galiyani) 
to attendees, such as prominent 
members of the Royal Thai 
Government. As pan of the Landmine 
Awareness Program, ADPC coordi-
nates monthly mine awareness 
seminars in Sa Keao province. 
U.S. assistance began in 1999 
with help in establishing a mine action 
center in Ratchaburi and a community 
mine awareness program centered in 
Lop Buri. Several rotations of training 
assistance began in August 1999, while 
the seventh rotation of these teams 
arrived in January 2001. To date, there 
have been 300 deminers trained and a 
cadre of the selected students assuming 
instructor duties to support the live 
mine clearance operations which 
began in July 2000. It is anticipated 
that sustainment rotations will begin 
in 2002 with upgrade training and 
component course training in specific 
skills. 
VIETNAM 
Since the Vietnam War ended in 
197 5, it is estimated by the 
Vietnamese government and foreign 
experts that more than 4,000 
Vietnamese have been injured and at 
least 500 killed in accidents involving 
landmines and UXO. U.S. and U.N. 
estimates put the number of mines in 
Vietnam-a battlefield from rhe 
1940s until the 1970s-ar 3.5 million. 
The mine/UXO threat is varied 
and many of the munitions are dated 
and rusted-making many more 
sensitive and more dangerous. 
Vietnam itself produced as many as 18 
types of AP mines in the past, mostly 
as copies of U.S. or Eastern Bloc 
mines. The only type known to have 
been produced in the 1990s is the 
"apple mine "-a recycled BLU-24 
bomblet. A majority of the heavy 
landmine and UXO threat is in and 
around Quang Tri province in central 
Vietnam along the former 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between 
north and south. Other heavily mined 
areas were along rhe Sino-Vietnam 
border. While China claims to have 
cleared all of its mines from this area, 
Vietnam says that it cleared more than 
100,000 mines from the border 
between 1992-97. 
In July of 2000, an assessment 
team briefed the U.S. Interagency 
Working Group on the Vietnamese 
request for U.S. assistance. As a result, 
the IWG approved the inclusion of 
Vietnam in the U.S. program. The 
initial support package is anticipated 
to support ongoing demining efforts 
by providing equipment worth about 
$1.7 million to help mine clearance 
and mine action program manage-
ment efforts. The Vietnamese have a 
particular need for assistance with 
demining and ordnance clearance in 
shallow littoral areas, as well. The U.S. 
assistance program is still under 
formulation and will commence in the 
summer of2001. 
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Other Regional Concerns 
There are other landmine plagued 
countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim. 
At the top of most any list would be 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, 
Korea, China, India, Pakistan and 
Taiwan. Of course, there are very 
specific guide! ines to be met and 
procedures to be followed by a country 
desiring to receive U.S. humanitarian 
demining. In general, U.S. assistance 
is predicated on (1) the host nation 
submitting a formal request for 
assistance through its U.S. Embassy, 
(2) hostilities in the country having 
ceased and a workable peace 
agreement being in place, and (3) the 
landmine hazards being clearly 
present. 
Not all countries that have 
requested U.S. assistance have been 
approved. Also, the demand for the 
highly skilled Special Forces teams in 
other areas around the globe is causing 
a shortage of qualified trainers rhar 
limits the availability of these teams. 
In many cases, a periodic assessment 
and support team visit, skills upgrade, 
quality assurance review and analysis, 
or other limited assistance may be all 
that can be realistic for any given 
request. The decision to support any 
country with assistance rests with the 
Interagency Working Group (IWG) 
co-chaired by the U.S. Departments 
of State and Defense. 
Other countries in the Pacific also 
have significant mine problems but are 
either ineligible for U.S. assistance or 
have not asked for assistance. In 
Myanmar, 10 our of the 14 stares and 
divisions are mined and had some 
I ,500 landmine victims reported in 
1999 alone. In the Karen state, it is 
believed that one person is either 
injured or killed by a landmine every 
day. Information from within the 
country is unreliable and what is 
known comes from aid organizations 
working along the Myanmar-Thailand 
border. Myanmar also still manu-
factures landmines th at are used 
regularly by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) to 
fight the various armed resistance 
groups barding with the mili ta ry 
regime, including ethnic minority 
groups from the Shan, Karen and 
Karenni states in rhe east of Myanmar, 
and Chin and Arakan stares in the 
west. The two most common are 
patterned after the Chinese Type 58 
blast mine and Type 59 stake mine. 
Another key Pacific country with 
a significant landmine problem is Sri 
Lanka. By the end of 1999, a small 
U.N. demining ream in Jaffna 
supported by the Australian and 
Dutch governments had cleared about 
68,500 sq. m of mined land, destroyed 
577 APLs and unearthed 42 
unexploded devices. Clashes with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) are increasing and ovenaking 
land formerly held and controlled by 
gove rnment forces. Meanwhile, 
refugees' occupat ion of previously 
mined areas is a major humanitarian 
concern in a conflict that has killed 
65,000 people since 1983. The LTTE 
has become adept at using landmines 
in addition to weaponry that is often 
far more advanced and plentiful than 
those used by government forces, as 
evidenced by rhe their purchase of 
SA14 m issiles from Bulgaria and 60 
tons of high explosives from the 
Ukraine. The consecutive losses of II 
government camps in rhe Wanni in 
November 1999 and Elephant Pass in 
April 2000 demonstrated that this 
conflict is likely to persist for some 
ume. 
A major new development in 
June 2000 occurred with the report of 
landmines in rhe Philippines. Guerilla 
groups from the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and the New 
People's Army have been employing 
landmines against government and 
police forces, as have the bandit groups 
from the smaller Abu Sayyaf who 
kidnapped tourists in 2000. Of major 
concern is rhar many of the radical 
groups in the Philippines and 
Indonesia may be developing 
operational ties since a raid on a major 
MILF base last July resulted in 
Indonesian passports being discovered. 
The national army appears to be fully 
capable of meeting this threat and it 
is not anticipated that the U.S. 
government will become actively 
engaged in assisting the Philippines in 
the near furure. As bilateral military 
exercises are conducted annually with 
the Philippines, this threat is 
recognized and dealt with to ensure 
proper awareness and responses are 
considered for the safety of all forces. 
Ethnic unrest and uncertainty 
must continually be watched as small 
and poorly armed, bur devoted 
insurgency groups seek to instill fear 
and respect through the use of cheap 
and easily manufactured weapons such 
as APLs and other similar improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). 
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Police and Islamic activists with 
homemade bombs clashed 111 
Brahmanbaria, Bangladesh, on 
February 6, killing six. A landmine 
arrack in Kashmir, India, by the 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militants killed two 
soldiers on February 7. After a 
relatively mine-free conflict in East 
Timor, Indonesia, ended, the 
government there now faces a growing 
threat from others looking to follow 
as the growing build up in West Papua 
is being watched closely. 
Finally, the Maoist insurgency has 
been growing in Nepal. In September 
2000, 14 policemen were killed when 
the headquarters in the Dolpa district 
were sieged. There were no reports of 
APLs or IEDs being used in this 
instance, bur the concern remains even 
today. 
As long as landmines and UXO 
hamper post conflict reconstruction, 
pose a significant threat to civilians 
and cause imernal shifts in refugees in 
Asia and the Pacific, there will be a 
need for training assistance and 
support that is ideally suited to the 
skills, experiences and expertise of the 
U.S. military units in the Pacific. 
When it is called upon to provide this 
assistance, SOCPAC will coordinate 
and manage irs employment and 
program content to ensure that the 
highest quality training support and 
assistance is given. The end result will 
be a sustainable program and an able 
host nation capability. • 
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